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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 13 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of August 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as an official document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 13 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2011	0635	An Israeli enemy patrol consisting of some seven men crossed the Wazzani River into Lebanese territory, violating the Blue Line, and entered a restaurant at coordinates Q138995 — N147321. Lebanese Army soldiers mobilized, taking up combat positions and firing into the air over the enemy patrol, forcing them to retreat. Israeli enemy personnel inside occupied Palestinian territory then opened fire, using medium and light automatic weapons and grenade launchers, towards the Lebanese Army Maysat post. The post's emplacement and water tank were hit and one soldier was lightly injured by flying gravel.
	0907	An Israeli enemy tank, while moving from the Hadab position to the Salih Ma'adin position directed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
2 August 2011	2050	At the Abbasiyah Gate, an Israeli enemy patrol consisting of three Hummer vehicles directed their vehicles' headlights towards Ghajar mosque for 30 minutes.
	2130	From the post south of Ghajar, an Israeli enemy patrol consisting of two Hummer vehicles directed their vehicles' headlights for 15 minutes towards the emplacement east of the Lebanese Army Maysat post.
4 August 2011	0900	An Israeli enemy bulldozer opposite the Lebanese Army Wazzani pumping station took stones from inside occupied Palestinian territory and dumped them outside the technical fence, inside the disputed area.
8 August 2011	1030	A 12-man Israeli enemy foot patrol crossed the barbed wire fence into the liberated area inside Lebanese territory on the outskirts of Kafr Shuba, advancing to coordinates Q146416 - N152005 and encroaching some 200 metres beyond the withdrawal line.
	2325	Opposite the Khirbat Yarun Lebanese Army post, an Israeli enemy patrol consisting of three vehicles directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory for 10 minutes.
10 August 2011	2100 2215	The Israeli enemy combed the area surrounding the Ruwaysat al-Alam position, within the occupied Shab'a Farms area. At the same time, two enemy helicopters circled over the same area.
14 August 2011	1210	An Israeli enemy patrol halted opposite the Fatimah Gate and one man addressed Lebanese Army observation post personnel, using offensive language.
	1530	An Israeli enemy patrol opposite the Fatimah Gate photographed Lebanese Army observation post personnel and civilians in the area.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2300	In front of the Tarbikha Gate, an Israeli enemy patrol consisting of four vehicles directed torches towards Lebanese territory for 10 minutes.
16 August 2011	1800	Loud explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms until 1925 hours.
	2000	Loud explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms until 0015 hours on 17 August 2011.
18 August 2011	0745	An 18-man Israeli enemy patrol breached the technical fence by the Khalil Abdullah restaurant in Wazzani village but did not violate the Blue Line. At 0815 hours the patrol returned to occupied Palestinian territory.
	2000 2030	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, an Israeli enemy patrol directed searchlights towards houses in Abbasiyah village.
24 August 2011	1820	An Israeli enemy patrol pointed primed weapons towards Lebanese Army observation post personnel and civilians around the Fatimah Gate. They left at 1835 hours.
25 August 2011	0400	Opposite the Lebanese Army Marun al-Ra's post, an Israeli enemy patrol consisting of three Hummer vehicles directed their vehicles' headlights towards Lebanese territory. Patrol personnel also fired flare shells over the Lebanese territory beyond the technical fence before leaving at 0455 hours.
	1820	Israeli enemy patrol personnel directed a vehicle-mounted machine gun towards men at the Lebanese Army observation post at the Fatimah Gate.
	2030	Israeli enemy forces at the Matat barracks directed 12.7 mm machine gun fire towards Lebanese territory. Two bullets exploded over the Lebanese Army Abu Shinan position, and several others exploded over Tallat Qatmun on the outskirts of Rumaysh, near the old church that lies some 500 metres from the Lebanese Army position.
26 August 2011	1635	Israeli enemy patrol personnel directed weapons towards a soldier at the Lebanese Army observation post at the Fatimah Gate.
	1900	Israeli enemy patrol personnel directed a vehicle-mounted weapon and made vulgar gestures towards men at the Lebanese Army observation post at the Fatimah Gate.
	2125	The Israeli enemy for five minutes directed a searchlight from its Hadab post towards the Khirbat Yarun Lebanese Army post and the surrounding area.
27 August 2011	2105	The Israeli enemy for five minutes directed a searchlight from its Hadab post towards the Lebanese territory between the Khirbat Yarun Lebanese Army post and the 750 high site.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 August 2011	1925	An Israeli enemy patrol photographed Lebanese Army observation post personnel and civilians at the Fatimah Gate.
29 August 2011	1505	An Israeli enemy patrol photographed Lebanese Army observation post personnel at the Fatimah Gate.
	1800	Israeli enemy patrol personnel directed weapons towards soldiers at the Lebanese Army observation post at the Fatimah Gate.
	2020	The Israeli enemy for two minutes directed a searchlight from its Hadab post towards the Lebanese territory between the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun post and high site 750.
	0600 0930	From one of its positions inside occupied Palestinian territory, the Israeli enemy fired a number of artillery shells that landed near its positions inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1045	While an Israeli enemy Poclain machine was carrying out cleaning operations around the Israeli position, one member of a hostile patrol pointed a 12.7 mm machine gun towards soldiers at the Lebanese Army observation post at the Fatimah Gate.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2011	0025	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	2335	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
2 August 2011	0015	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	0040	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 25 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	0115	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	0155	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 35 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	0230	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0440	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	2225	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	2300	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
3 August 2011	2135	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 25 seconds.
	2150	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 25 seconds.
	2220	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
4 August 2011	0030	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	0045	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	0130	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	0140	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	0205	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.
	0240	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	0530	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2100	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2110	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2135	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2237	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2245	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2345	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2353	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
5 August 2011	0015	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	0340	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	0430	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
6 August 2011	0020	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight for 20 seconds towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0050	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0118	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0145	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0220	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0232	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0305	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0410	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0455	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
7 August 2011	2120	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2150	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	2320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
10 August 2011	0140	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.
	0245	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.
	0450	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.
13 August 2011	0215	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	0245	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
17 August 2011	0320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0400	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0430	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 1.
	0505	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
	2042	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
	2047	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
18 August 2011	0110	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0302	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0326	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0425	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0435	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0457	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 50 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0505	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	2025	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2110	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
19 August 2011	2110	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2135	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2230	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2305	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 15 seconds.
	2305	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 15 seconds.
20 August 2011	2005	An Israeli enemy military launch for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	2020	An Israeli enemy military launch for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	2105	An Israeli enemy military launch for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
	2215	An Israeli enemy military launch for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 August 2011	0010	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0200	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0230	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0300	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0445	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	0520	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
	2010	An Israeli enemy military launch for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
	2042	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2300	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
22 August 2011	2105	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	2320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
23 August 2011	0330	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
	0410	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
	2110	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2135	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2140	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2205	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2215	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2250	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2310	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2320	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
24 August 2011	2135	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 20 seconds.
	2205	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	2345	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.
25 August 2011	0010	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	0020	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	0050	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	0300	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
27 August 2011	0105	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0145	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
	0210	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0431	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 2.
28 August 2011	0305	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 3.
29 August 2011	0015	An Israeli enemy military launch for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters around the line of buoys.
	0110	An Israeli enemy military launch for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2 and 3.
30 August 2011	0100	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and 40 seconds.
	0110	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for two minutes and 40 seconds.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2011	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1056 hours.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Naqurah.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Rashayya al-Fukhkhar, Hasbayya and Khiyam before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0912	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1310 hours over Naqurah.
	1210	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1220 hours.
	2032	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2055 hours.
2 August 2011	0431	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1517 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1755 hours over Naqurah.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Dahr al-Baydar, the South and the Bekaa before leaving over Kafr Killa at 0105 hours on 3 August 2011.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over the sea off Tripoli, heading north.
3 August 2011	0503	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0952 hours.
	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving over Rumaysh at 0610 hours on 4 August 2011.
	0935	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2055	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2110 hours.
	2110	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2215 hours.
4 August 2011	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1515 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving over Rumaysh at 0130 hours on 5 August 2011.
	2050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab`a Farms. It circled over Hasbayya, Rashayya, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving over Naqurah at 1530 hours on 5 August 2011.
5 August 2011	0602	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1707 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 August 2011	2045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2145 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2150 hours over Rumaysh.
	2131	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0445 hours on 7 August 2011.
7 August 2011	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	2037	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1313 hours on 8 August 2011.
8 August 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Naqurah.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1834	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2302 hours.
9 August 2011	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1805 hours over Rumaysh.
	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 2300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1350 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 August 2011	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, the Bekaa, Sa`diyat and Damur before leaving over Rumaysh at 0115 hours on 11 August 2011.
	0755	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over the South before leaving at 0935 hours over Naqurah.
	0840	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1000 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	0840	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1000 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0845	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0935 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1935 hours over Rumaysh.
	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Bekaa and Al-Arz (the Cedars) before leaving at 1550 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 August 2011	0240	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0253 hours.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Bekaa, Beirut and the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0325 hours on 12 August 2011.
	1045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
12 August 2011	1820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2241 hours.
13 August 2011	1409	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1805 hours.
	1845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2245 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2256	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2330 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 August 2011	1520	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Hula before leaving at 1530 hours.
	1810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Kafr Killa.
15 August 2011	0710	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1802 hours.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1008	An enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1901.
	1110	An enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	1840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2006 hours.
16 August 2011	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Beirut before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
	1015	Six Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1125 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2040 hours over Naqurah.
	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2150 hours over Naqurah.
	2330	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving over Naqurah at 0940 hours on 17 August 2011.
	2355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0940 hours on 17 August 2011.
17 August 2011	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1935 hours over Naqurah.
	1820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2024 hours.
18 August 2011	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0913	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1551 hours.
19 August 2011	0020	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 0041 hours.
	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1753 hours.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1850 hours over Naqurah.
20 August 2011	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
21 August 2011	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0932	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 2005 hours.
	2125	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2138 hours.
	2150	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2155 hours.
22 August 2011	0852	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0853 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving over Naqurah at 2200 hours.
23 August 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	0946	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
24 August 2011	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1015 hours.
	1045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2026 hours.
	1110	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1654	Two Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2124 hours.
25 August 2011	1055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
	1929	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1942 hours.
	2020	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2234 hours.
	2235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0327 hours on 26 August 2011.
26 August 2011	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 2040 hours.
27 August 2011	0757	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 0912 hours.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 0927 hours.
28 August 2011	0638	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1135 hours.
	1245	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1250 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1258	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1300 hours.
	1800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
29 August 2011	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Naqurah.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1924	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1926 hours.
	1931	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2147 hours.
	2139	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2202 hours.
31 August 2011	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0843	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0950 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.

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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Revised estimates relating to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013 under section 29D, Office of Central Support Services, and section 30, Office of Information and Communications Technology, related to the organizational resilience management system: emergency management framework

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/260, section II, paragraph 11, wherein the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive emergency management framework, including emergency preparedness and victim support components that would draw upon international best practices, and to submit a proposal in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

The present report describes a comprehensive emergency management framework based on the organizational resilience management system approach. It also describes the outcome, to date, of a pilot organizational resilience management system in the Secretariat and presents an example of its practical application in the context of the secondary data centre in Piscataway, New Jersey.

The report sets out proposed resource requirements in relation to the organizational resilience management system and a programme of work to maintain the secondary data centre, in respect of the biennium 2012-2013, under section 29D, Office of Central Support Services, and section 30, Office of Information and Communications Technology, of the proposed programme budget and under the support account for peacekeeping operations.

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It should be noted that the present report is symbiotic with the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Enterprise information and communications technology initiatives for the United Nations Secretariat" (A/66/94), specifically the initiative entitled "Create a resilient information and communication technology infrastructure", which concentrates on the complementary technology aspects of emergency management.

I. Background

1. The varied nature of threats faced by the Organization, including critical infrastructure failures and natural hazard events, together with the vulnerability of its global operations, pose a major challenge. The need to effectively manage the impact of, and to respond to, these adverse events requires efforts beyond the crisis management, emergency response, business continuity planning and victim support efforts previously undertaken by the Secretariat and away from Headquarters and at its locations away from New York.

2. To address these challenges and pursuant to a request of the General Assembly in its resolution 64/260, a coordinated, integrated and holistic framework for emergency management, encompassing all risk-based emergency preparedness and response disciplines, is proposed in the present report. The report also seeks to respond to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 65/290 on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peacekeeping operations, that the organizational resilience functions in the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support be reviewed in the context of the report requested by the Assembly in its resolution 64/260 (sect. II, para. 11).

3. Emergency preparedness and resilience, essential elements of organizational governance, are of the utmost importance when planning and conducting activities mandated by the Secretariat at all of its locations. Recognizing this, the senior emergency policy team (see below) approved a proposal by the Crisis Operations Group to pilot an organizational resilience management system[1] approach at United Nations Headquarters as the basis for the development of a Secretariat-wide emergency management framework. In addition to harmonizing and aligning the different preparedness activities of the Organization, this framework, based on international standards and best practices, will ensure that it is better prepared to effectively respond to and recover from serious disruptive incidents.

II. Aim of the organizational resilience management system

4. The organizational resilience management system is a Secretariat initiative, based upon international best practice, to establish a comprehensive approach to the identification and management of risks related to critical disruptive events of any nature. Implementation of the system will allow the Secretariat to better prepare for and respond to disruptive events and, in many cases, preclude or inhibit those events from intensifying into emergency, crisis or disaster situations.

5. Currently, emergency preparedness efforts in the Secretariat are composed of separate planning initiatives that are led by various departments, with specialized expertise in their respective substantive areas: safety and security emergency operations (led by the Department of Safety and Security), business continuity planning, staff and victim support and medical planning (led by the Department of Management) and information technology disaster recovery planning (led by the

[1] American National Standards Institute, ASIS International SPC.1-2009 — Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness, and Continuity Management Systems.

Office of Information and Communications Technology). While most Secretariat locations have implemented a crisis decision-making structure that activates their different emergency preparedness plans, the Secretariat would benefit from the further elaboration of a comprehensive framework under which these initiatives can be coordinated and integrated.

6. The organizational resilience management system provides an emergency management framework that integrates emergency planning and preparedness prior to a critical event, as well as subsequent actions that address organizational crisis response, recovery, reconstitution and the return to normal business. It specifies Secretariat crisis management arrangements and brings together the emergency management aspects of the functions of business continuity, security, safety, emergency medical response, information technology disaster recovery and staff and victim support. Emergency plans associated with these functions are interlinked and mutually dependent.

7. The organizational resilience management system constitutes a "management system" approach whereby plans are developed using a systematic and coordinated process. This is in contrast to the current "silo" approach to emergency management, whereby Secretariat entities develop emergency plans that do not take into account their relationships, linkages and mutual dependencies.

8. For example, the pandemic planning exercise, which began with the threat posed by the H5N1 virus in 2005, demonstrated the benefit of emergency management plans being linked and interdependent. Such preparedness plans cannot be invoked without a crisis management structure codified in a crisis management plan. Similarly, a pandemic plan sets priorities not only for business process recovery, but also for information technology recovery. It follows then that plans must be harmonized under an integrated emergency management framework.

9. On a practical level, adopting the organizational resilience management system as a management approach would establish workflows and procedures for the common processes of individual activities, such as risk assessment, the development of risk management actions and plan maintenance, exercise and review, so that they can be conducted jointly in a coordinated way. This will result in the development and implementation of a system corresponding to a crisis environment that necessitates the simultaneous activation of the crisis response plans of multiple activities. The consequence will be a more efficient use of time and resources and improved crisis response effectiveness throughout the Secretariat.

III. Methodology for establishing and maintaining the organizational resilience management system

10. The proposed emergency management framework based on the organizational resilience management system comprises interlinked plans, with clear roles and responsibilities for decision-making and implementation, coupled with a structured maintenance, exercise and review programme. Its implementation consists of five consecutive steps: (a) policy establishment, (b) planning, (c) implementation, (d) evaluation and (e) management review.

11. As described above, the first step is to specify an organizational resilience management policy. The second step consists of a threat and risk assessment of the

natural, political, social and technological environment that could disrupt operations at a given location, the outcome of which is a prioritized list of risks with associated risk management measures that will be established and linked to a programme for action. The third step constitutes the implementation phase, which commences with the identification of roles and responsibilities within the system. Step four consists of a comprehensive evaluation of the system programme. This step will use the feedback from a maintenance, exercise and review regime as a major source of information. Step five completes the cycle with a management review.

12. Within the Secretariat, the senior emergency policy team, chaired by the Chef de Cabinet and composed of the senior leadership of most Secretariat departments, as well as high-level representatives from agencies, funds and programmes based in New York, is responsible for emergency management policy decisions. In June 2010, the senior emergency policy team approved an organizational resilience management system policy that supported the development of a pilot system focused on Headquarters in New York. Subsequently, a development group was established to develop the system as the pilot emergency management framework at Headquarters using the five-step cycle.

13. The development group conducted the planning and implementation steps of the five-step cycle, comprising the establishment of the objectives of the system, the conduct of a risk and impact assessment, the analysis of priority risks and the derivation of risk management actions from them, one of which is the maintenance of the secondary data centre (see sect. V below). The development group also assigned roles and responsibilities and developed a maintenance, exercise and review programme. The output of the planning effort was the production of a draft organizational resilience management system framework, a supporting United Nations handbook and a maintenance, evaluation and review programme for 2011-2012.

14. Upon the successful implementation of the pilot project mentioned above, the senior emergency policy team, in November 2010, reviewed and endorsed the organizational resilience management system as the emergency management framework. This endorsement validated the five-step cycle and laid the foundation for full implementation of the system throughout the global network of the Secretariat.

15. In parallel, a pilot project on the implementation of the system in field locations was conducted by the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in close coordination with the Department of Management. A training course for 22 field staff from 15 missions was conducted in April 2011. The course was presented by a joint team of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support and Management. While the course focused on business continuity planning, it also introduced the organizational resilience management system as the overarching emergency management framework. At the same time, the departments successfully conducted a pilot project to test business continuity methodology (including the organizational resilience management system framework) in several field missions.

IV. Roles and responsibilities

A. Overall responsibility

16. As mentioned in paragraph 12 above, the senior emergency policy team is accountable to the Secretary-General and is responsible for emergency management policy decisions. Under the organizational resilience management system, it also maintains strategic oversight over the framework within the Secretariat. The team is supported in its responsibilities in relation to the framework by the Business Continuity Management Unit in the Department of Management.

17. The Department of Management, as the lead department for the system, is responsible for developing, coordinating and integrating policy, planning, implementation and review procedures and processes and for obtaining the endorsement of the senior emergency policy team thereon. The Department of Management fulfils these responsibilities in close consultation and coordination with other Secretariat departments and, at their request, will also provide emergency preparedness planning assistance. In order to carry out its responsibilities in regard to the system, the Department of Management requires a minimum number of dedicated staff members.

18. Secretariat departments, offices, functional commissions, regional commissions and other bodies are responsible for implementing the system in their respective organizations, field presences and field operations, in accordance with policy and procedures, as approved by the senior emergency policy team. To achieve their responsibilities organizations with large field presences and operations will also require a minimum number of dedicated staff members.

B. Responsibilities of individual departments and offices

19. Recognizing that all the departments of the Organization work together in a coordinated way to achieve emergency preparedness and to bring to bear their specialized expertise, different departments have the leading role for different preparedness plans, as described below.

20. The Department of Management leads the development, coordination and integration of policy and planning procedures for the system, in close consultation with other affected departments. It is responsible for providing implementation assistance to Secretariat departments and offices in New York, as well as to offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions.

21. Upon request, the Department of Management will also provide assistance for the implementation of the system in field operations to the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

22. Within the Department of Management, the Business Continuity Management Unit in the Office of Central Support Services is responsible for providing guidance and hands-on support for the business continuity planning process at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. The Unit has also worked with the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support to fulfil their responsibility to introduce the required business

continuity framework and tools and to develop the required capacity to sustain business continuity in field operations.

23. The Office of Human Resources Management hosts the emergency preparedness and support team, which is dedicated to establishing human resource management mechanisms in the case of emergencies involving United Nations staff members. The role of the team is to coordinate, enable and guide the Secretariat, funds and programmes and all stakeholders prior to, during and after a crisis on all matters related to emergency preparedness and support. The team will work across the Organization at both the strategic and operational level, through best practices, lessons learned and tools, to enable each office and component involved in emergency preparedness and response to plan and work from a standard harmonized methodology. The team also serves as the communication hub for the Organization on all issues pertaining to staff, their dependants, victims and survivors of crisis situations. With respect to the emergency preparedness and support team, the Office of Human Resources Management intends to come forward with resource requests, where necessary, in the biennium 2014-2015, following a review of the workflow and activities of the team.

24. The Medical Services Division in the Office of Human Resources Management, which is responsible for providing direct medical support to Headquarters, also has a role within the organizational resilience management system framework. The Division is responsible for providing all United Nations duty stations with policy, guidance, support and training regarding public health emergencies (e.g. influenza pandemics or outbreaks of cholera) and mass casualty incidents (e.g. bombings, earthquakes and other natural disasters). This entails proactive assistance to Headquarters and other duty stations to develop, implement, maintain and test public health, emergency medical and mass casualty management plans.

25. Under the direction of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, the Department of Safety and Security oversees the security management system, including security planning and its integration into the organizational resilience management system. The Division of Headquarters Safety and Security Services provides crisis planning capabilities and is responsible for crisis management plans, security and contingency plans for Headquarters locations, offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions.

26. As set out in the reports of the Secretary-General on the enterprise content management and customer relationship management systems and proposal for a unified disaster recovery and business continuity plan (A/64/477) and on enterprise information and communications technology initiatives for the United Nations Secretariat (A/66/94), the Office of Information and Communications Technology is to establish broad principles and develop a programme of work in which plans are set out for the resumption of critical information and communications technology services after a disruption that has had an adverse impact on key business functions of the Organization. This includes a joint effort with all units to identify critical applications that must be resilient and available in a timely fashion after a crisis.

27. Other departments work with the lead departments and offices identified above and participate in the development of overarching preparedness plans for the Organization and for their own department or office. As indicated below, departments with a field presence are responsible for preparing and executing, as

necessary, the preparedness plans for all offices, operations and/or missions falling under their direct responsibility.

C. Expansion of the organizational resilience management system to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes

28. Experience gained during the inter-agency pandemic planning and business continuity planning exercises points to the potential value of adopting a common emergency management framework with the specialized agencies, funds and programmes, based on the organizational resilience management system.

29. The necessity of integrating elements of emergency preparedness to improve resilience to adverse events and to reduce the burden on field offices by realizing economies through the integration of emergency planning exercises has also been recognized by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) is currently developing a similar approach: the WFP preparedness and response enhancement programme. The programme consists of a three-year initiative with the objective of enhancing the emergency preparedness and response capabilities of WFP, strengthening the links between headquarters and the field and enabling increasing levels of response and accountability. Under this programme, emergency preparedness and response planning will be enhanced, including the sustainable integration of risk management processes — security, operational risk management and business continuity — through the roll-out of an integrated emergency preparedness and response package.

30. The Secretary-General proposes to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session a follow-up report summarizing the progress made in the implementation of the organizational resilience management system in the Secretariat and introducing a more comprehensive framework, including for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. In addition, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 64/260 related to the emergency preparedness and support team, in the context of the comprehensive emergency management framework, the team will develop the emergency preparedness and victim support components, drawing on international best practices.

V. Practical application

31. A key benefit of the organizational resilience management system approach is integration, which is a fundamental feature underlying the emergency management framework. As part of the organizational resilience management framework pilot scheme, the Secretariat crisis management structure has endorsed the risk assessment produced by the development group, which is drawn from the key Secretariat departments and offices having emergency management responsibilities and from other United Nations agencies based in New York. By virtue of the interdepartmental and inter-agency composition of the group, risk management actions reflect the interests of the United Nations at large.

32. Two practical examples of this approach are the continued maintenance of the secondary data centre in Piscataway, New Jersey, and the proposed procurement of specialized software needed for the ongoing maintenance of the different emergency

preparedness plans that fall under the organizational resilience management system framework. Both of these requirements have been identified as key management actions.

A. Secondary data centre

Establishment of the centre in Piscataway

33. In its resolution 63/269, the General Assembly approved the proposal of the Secretary-General, contained in his report on information and communications technology, disaster recovery and business continuity for the United Nations (A/63/743), to establish a new secondary data centre for United Nations Headquarters to replace the existing centre in the DC2 Building in New York. It was recognized that while the primary data centre was being relocated from the Secretariat building to the basement of the North Lawn Building, there would be a risk of information system failure. In order to mitigate that risk, a new secondary data centre would be created during the transitional period. As subsequently reported by the Secretary-General in his report on a proposal for risk mitigation measures to protect data and the information and communications systems of the Secretariat during construction work of the capital master plan (A/64/346/Add.1), the Secretariat identified a suitable data centre facility in Piscataway, New Jersey, and entered into a 30-month lease, commencing on 1 July 2009 (with an option to renew, if necessary, for an additional 30 months). In its resolution 64/228, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to take advantage of the current economic climate in order to negotiate the most cost-effective lease and services possible and to report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

34. Design of the facility was started in the first week of July 2009 and construction began in early August 2009. Construction was completed in the fourth quarter of 2009 and the facility became fully operational shortly thereafter. As reported in the eighth annual progress report on the implementation of the capital master plan (A/65/511), the secondary data centre was completed on time and ensured uninterrupted service for systems that were relocated during the period of the primary data centre migration, thus mitigating risks associated with the move. The capital master plan migration process, to which the secondary data centre was a key contributor, was completed on 15 October 2010.

Broadening the purpose of the secondary data centre to include support for the organizational resilience management system

35. Since October 2010, the secondary data centre has continued to operate as a replacement for the disaster recovery facility in the DC2 Building, which was in service for many years. At present, the secondary data centre is hosting enterprise-critical systems; however, it would be more cost-effective to integrate enterprise-critical applications, such as Umoja, i-Need, Inspira, e-mail and the Integrated Management Information System, into the enterprise data centres. Hence, the Secretary-General, in his report on enterprise information and communications

technology initiatives for the Secretariat (A/66/94),[2] proposes to migrate all enterprise-critical systems to the enterprise data centres, which will lessen the requirements on the secondary data centre to provide resilience for Headquarters, as well as other duty stations. It is expected that as the organizational resilience management system is further implemented, other enterprise-critical systems will be identified (in a collaborative exercise among departments and offices, the Business Continuity Management Unit and the Office of Information and Communications Technology), which will further reduce the requirements for the secondary data centre and correspondingly other local data centres within the Secretariat.

36. Going forward, the secondary data centre will need to remain in service to support site-specific applications and to support organizational resilience at Headquarters. Should the Assembly approve the proposal of the Secretary-General for the enterprise data centres, it is estimated that it will take two years to migrate the current list of enterprise-critical applications. Thereafter, it will be possible to reduce the size and cost of the secondary data centre.

37. In its report on information and communications technology security, disaster recovery and business continuity for the United Nations (A/63/774), specifically paragraphs 7, 8, 13, 14, 20 and 21, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions raised a number of matters regarding the establishment of the secondary data centre. These are addressed in annexes I and II to the present report.

Status of the secondary data centre

38. Funding for the establishment of the secondary data centre and its operation through to 2011 were provided jointly under the budget of the capital master plan and the support account for peacekeeping operations. An overview of actual and projected expenditure against approved funding for the implementation of the centre is provided in tables 1 to 3 below.

[2] See paras. 121, 122 and 123 (d). The enterprise data centre proposal comprises two data centres: the primary one is at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindsi, Italy, whose function is to host enterprise-critical systems for duty stations worldwide, and the secondary centre is at the United Nations Support Base in Valencia, Spain, which serves as a backup system to provide organizational resilience.

Table 1
Expenditure for the biennium 2008-2009 against approved funding from the capital master plan
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*Approved*[a] *(a)*	*Expenditure (b)*	*Unexpended balance (c)=(a)–(b)*
1. Non-recurrent expenditures			
Contractual services	1 273.7	1 115.8	157.8
Furniture and equipment			
Data centre equipment	1 823.8	1 860.0	(36.2)
Subtotal	**3 097.5**	**2 975.8**	**121.6**
2. Recurrent expenditures			
General operating expenses			
Lease of data centre facility	1 515.2	1 467.4	47.8
Furniture and equipment			
Data centre equipment maintenance and lease	484.2	403.0	81.2
Subtotal	**1 999.4**	**1 870.4**	**129.0**
Total	**5 096.9**	**4 846.2**	**250.6**

[a] General Assembly resolution 63/269; see also A/64/346/Add.1.

Table 2
Projected expenditure for the biennium 2010-2011 against approved funding from the capital master plan
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*Approved*[a] *2010-2011 (a)*	*Expenditure 2010 (b)*	*Forecast 2011 (c)*	*Unexpended balance (d)=(a)–(b)–(c)*
General operating expenses				
Lease of data centre facility	2 261.6	1 130.8	1 130.8	—
Contractual services				
Data centre services (other contractors)	1 713.4	1 009.7	548.9	154.8
Furniture and equipment				
Data centre equipment acquisition and maintenance	5 428.3	1 976.5	3 323.8	128.0
Communication				
Telecommunication	2 193.5	—	2 193.5	—
Construction				
Alterations and improvements	47.7	36.6	—	11.1
Total	**11 644.5**	**4 153.6**	**7 197.0**	**293.9**

[a] General Assembly resolution 64/228.

Table 3

Actual and projected expenditure to 30 June 2012 against approved funding from the support account for peacekeeping operations

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*Approved 2009/10*	*Expenditure 2009/10*	*Approved 2010/11*	*Expenditure 2010/11*	*Approved 2011/12*	*Forecast 2011/12*
1. Non-recurrent expenditures						
Contractual services						
Commissioning equipment	301.4	1 254.3	—	—	—	—
Migrating applications	109.7	—	—	—	—	—
Furniture and equipment						
Data centre equipment	430.6	—	—	—	—	—
Travel	100.0	92.2	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	**941.7**	**1 346.5**	**—**	**—**	**—**	**—**
2. Recurrent expenditures						
General operating expenses						
Lease of data centre facility	687.7	676.3	401.4	401.4	326.3	212.8
Contractual services						
Data centre services (other contractors)	—	—	298.4	282.1	143.8	137.2
Furniture and equipment						
Data centre equipment maintenance and lease	402.4	—	554.4	533.9	471.5	456.3
Communication						
Telecommunication	—	—	—	—	—	92.7
Subtotal	**1 090.1**	**676.3**	**1 254.2**	**1 217.4**	**941.6**	**899.0**
Total	**2 031.8**	**2 022.8**	**1 254.2**	**1 217.4**	**941.6**	**899.0**

Future requirements for the secondary data centre

39. In his report on the status of the information and communications technology strategy for the United Nations Secretariat (A/65/491), the Secretary-General requested approval to enter into the optional lease extension for the site of the secondary data centre, which was recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report on information and communications technology (A/65/576) and subsequently endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 65/259.

40. The lease is for 2,400 ft^2 of data centre space and an additional 1,569 ft^2 of office space that is currently being used as a network operations centre for the secondary data centre.

41. *The lease cost associated with the data centre* is inclusive of the provision of all data centre support infrastructure (emergency power distribution and computer room air-conditioning systems) and the cost associated with its operation and

maintenance. The United Nations is responsible for the cost of electricity and diesel fuel, based on monthly consumption.

42. The overall financial requirements for the secondary data centre facility over the course of 30 months, from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014, are shown below in table 4.

Table 4
Projected resource requirements under the regular budget and from the support account for peacekeeping operations
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Regular budget		*Peacekeeping budget*[a]			
Object of expenditure	*2012-2013*	*2014-2015*	*2011/12*	*2012/13*	*2013/14*	*Total*
Recurrent expenditures						
Contractual services						
Data centre services (other contractors)	—	—	137.2	—	—	137.2
General operating expenses						
Lease of data centre facility and utilities	1 767.6	458.3	212.8	220.9	229.2	2 888.8
Data centre equipment maintenance and lease	388.8	97.2	456.3	48.6	48.6	1 039.5
Communications	741.9	185.5	92.7	92.7	92.7	1 205.5
Total	**2 898.3**	**741.0**	**899.0**	**362.2**	**370.5**	**5 271.0**

[a] 1 July-30 June.

43. The recurrent biennial operational costs for the secondary data centre will include:

(a) A provision of $137,200 as foreseen under contractual services for data centre services;

(b) A provision of $2,888,800 to cover the requirements under general operating expenses, which include the secondary data centre facility lease for 30 months covering the period 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014 ($2,348,200) and the cost of electricity for power and cooling ($540,600);

(c) A provision of $1,039,500 to cover the maintenance and support of the servers and network equipment in the centre, including the lease payments for storage;

(d) A provision of $1,205,500 for telecommunication costs to cover Internet ($273,200) and gigabyte Ethernet ($274,500) connections, Fibre Channel cables ($390,700) and synchronous optical networking ($267,100 base cost) to provide high-speed links to the centre.

44. It is proposed that the current cost-sharing arrangement for the centre, whereby 20 per cent of the costs are met from the peacekeeping support account and 80 per cent from the regular budget, be continued, on the basis of the proportion of capacity

in the Headquarters data centre used for peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations.

B. Software for maintenance of emergency preparedness plans and the staff accounting system

45. As described above, the organizational resilience management system framework encompasses all the different emergency preparedness plans of the Secretariat. It also identifies links and common activities that can be undertaken in a joint fashion within the framework. Two such activities are: (a) the implementation of a system to account for all staff based in New York in a crisis, identified as a requirement in the "lessons learned" review of the Haiti crisis response and from recent events in North Africa; and (b) the automated maintenance of essential information contained in the different preparedness plans.

46. The Department of Safety and Security maintains an emergency notification system for a limited number of staff, but the Organization generally relies on broadcast e-mail, an automated message on a staff information hotline and a static website to transmit crisis information to staff. These tools do not allow the Organization to effectively communicate with all staff during a crisis event and track their status. If a crisis occurs outside office hours, staff members will often not read their e-mail and may not receive important information. It is therefore crucial for reasons of safety and security to be able to contact all staff using the suite of telecommunication devices available, including personal mobile phones and e-mail. While a global solution is being considered, under the leadership of the Department of Safety and Security with the Business Continuity Management Unit, it is recommended that the current emergency staff notification system be expanded to allow for the concurrent notification in a crisis of all staff based in New York.

47. To ensure that the emergency notification system functions properly, it is necessary to conduct tests every two to three months by sending out test messages to all the available staff telecommunication devices. These tests involve costs, which are set out in table 5 below.

48. Common components of preparedness plans, such as maintenance of staff contact data and maintenance of information on the critical infrastructure of the Organization (business processes, information technology systems, documents, etc.), have to be continuously updated, requiring a lot of effort without an automated system.

49. To address this issue, it is proposed that the Organization, under the leadership of the Business Continuity Management Unit, procure specialized software that will allow for automated maintenance of all the information contained in preparedness plans, thereby avoiding time-intensive manual updating and duplication of the same information in different plan documents.

Resource requirements for software to maintain emergency preparedness plans and the staff accounting system

50. The resource requirements, summarized in table 5 below, under the regular budget for the biennium 2012-2013 for the procurement of software for the maintenance of emergency preparedness plans and the cost of expansion of the

existing staff accounting system are estimated as follows: (a) under furniture and equipment, a one-time provision of $95,000 for the procurement of software that will allow for the maintenance of emergency preparedness plans; (b) under contractual services, a one-time provision of $68,000 for the cost of expansion of the current emergency notification system; (c) a recurrent provision of $20,000 for the biennial maintenance fee for software for the emergency preparedness plans; and (d) a provision of $60,000 for the cost of regularly conducting tests of the emergency notification system.

Table 5

Regular budget resource requirements for software, 2012-2013

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	
1. Non-recurrent expenditure	
Furniture and equipment	
Software to maintain emergency preparedness plans	95.0
Contractual services	
Maintenance fee for expansion of the emergency notification system	68.0
2. Recurrent expenditure	
Contractual services	
Biennial maintenance fee for software to maintain emergency preparedness plans	20.0
Testing of the emergency notification system	60.0
Total	**243.0**

VI. Request for the establishment of posts for business continuity in the Department of Management, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support

51. The three temporary positions of the Business Continuity Management Unit (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service) have been funded through general temporary assistance since September 2007. The positions were originally established to take on the work of the New York pandemic coordinator, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General on revised estimates relating to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 to ensure operational preparedness and business continuity in a protracted human influenza pandemic crisis (A/62/328), and to ensure implementation of business continuity at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions.

52. As a result, a business continuity planning methodology has been implemented in all of those duty stations. While business continuity programmes and capabilities have been established under general temporary assistance funding, it has been recognized that the effective maintenance of these programmes requires a more permanent and dedicated set-up. It is therefore proposed to convert the positions in

the Business Continuity Management Unit into established posts under the regular budget.

53. This will ensure that business continuity management will be successfully maintained and embedded in the culture of the Organization, enhancing its institutionalization and resilience. Maintaining a complex programme, such as business continuity management, is not achievable with a one-time effort, but requires continuous investment on the part of the Organization..

54. Furthermore, since its establishment, the tasks of the Business Continuity Management Unit have been extended. As described in the present report, the Unit will also take on the function of provision of support and guidance for the implementation of organizational resilience in the Organization, making a more permanent establishment of the Unit's posts even more essential. In addition, the Unit is frequently called upon to assist other entities with the implementation of business continuity, ensuring that the United Nations follows a consistent approach to business continuity and enabling it to respond in a more coherent fashion when faced with adverse events.

55. The Unit will continue to be located in the Office of Central Support Services, under the direct supervision of the Assistant Secretary-General, and will perform the same functions.

56. While the overall business continuity strategy for the Secretariat is the joint responsibility of the Business Continuity Management Unit and the Office of Information and Communications Technology, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have sole responsibility for implementing business continuity within their headquarters and field operations, with oversight from the Business Continuity Management Unit and the Office of Information and Communications Technology. Since July 2010, two general temporary assistance positions have been funded in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (1 P-4 Organizational Resilience Officer and 1 General Service) to enable the departments to meet their direct responsibility for organizational resilience at Headquarters and in all field missions.

57. Through the efforts of the staff engaged against these funds, a business continuity planning methodology that takes into account the peacekeeping dimension of emergency preparedness has been developed and implemented in all Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support field operations, with the support of the Department of Management and in line with the established business continuity framework. The roll-out of the planning methodology has been supported by a training course for field operation business continuity planners. As is the case for the Department of Management, business continuity programmes and capabilities established under general temporary assistance funding will continue to be needed to ensure the continuous and effective maintenance of organizational resilience programmes and business continuity plans, requiring an established, dedicated staff capacity of one P-4 post and one General Service (Other level) post for the purpose.

58. The evolution and proper implementation of the organizational resilience management system will require an expansion in coordination of emergency preparedness plans, in particular within the field operations, as well as the

development and oversight of related training and exercise programmes. It is therefore proposed to convert the two positions (1 P-4 Organizational Resilience Officer and 1 General Service support staff) into established posts, effective 1 July 2012, to be funded from the support account for peacekeeping operations for the financial period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013.

VII. Resource requirements

59. The Secretary-General has outlined above his proposals for a comprehensive emergency management framework based on the organizational resilience management system approach and requests the General Assembly to consider providing the following resources:

(a) With respect to the operational costs for the secondary data centre, the Secretary-General recommends that the Assembly approve resources in the amount of $2,898,300 for the operation of the centre;

(b) With respect to the software for maintenance of emergency preparedness plans and the staff accounting system, the Secretary-General recommends that the Assembly approve one-time resources for contractual services ($68,000) and acquisition of software ($95,000), as well as recurrent resources for software maintenance and testing of the system ($80,000);

(c) With respect to the three temporary positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) in the Business Continuity Management Unit provided from the regular budget, the Secretary-General recommends converting the three positions currently funded from general temporary assistance to established posts, effective 1 January 2012, as it has been determined that they will be required on a continuing basis. The Secretary-General also recommends a similar action for the two temporary positions (1 P-4 and 1 General Service) in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, currently funded from general temporary assistance from the support account for peacekeeping operations, effective 1 July 2012.

60. Accordingly, should the General Assembly agree with the above proposals, additional resource requirements in the amount of $3,141,300 would be considered in accordance with the provisions governing the contingency fund in accordance with the terms of Assembly resolutions 41/213 and 42/211. In this regard, it is recalled that the Assembly, in its resolution 65/262, approved a contingency fund for the biennium 2012-2013 in the amount of $40.5 million.

VIII. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

61. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) To approve the organizational resilience management system approach as the emergency management framework;

(b) To approve the total estimated cost of the extended lease of the secondary data centre in Piscataway for 30 months beyond 31 December 2011, as endorsed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report on information and communications technology

(A/65/576), pending the further work required before the implementation of the proposed plan;

(c) To approve the conversion of the three existing general temporary assistance positions in the Business Continuity Management Unit to established posts under section 29D, Office of Central Support Services, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013;

(d) To appropriate a total amount of $3,141,300 under the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013, comprising increases under section 29D, Office of Central Support Services ($243,000), and section 30, Office of Information and Communications Technology ($2,898,300), representing a charge against the contingency fund;

(e) To note that the regular budget portion of the future remaining requirements of the secondary data centre for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2014, amounting to $741,000, will be included in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015;

(f) To approve the conversion of the two existing general temporary assistance organizational resilience positions (1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support to established posts, effective 1 July 2012, to be funded from the support account for peacekeeping operations for the financial period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013;

(g) To note that an amount of $941,600 under the support account for peacekeeping operations has been approved under resolution 64/228 for the financial period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 for the secondary data centre;

(h) To note that future requirements for the secondary data centre in an estimated amount of $362,200 will be included in the requirements for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the financial period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 and that an estimated amount of $370,500 will be included in the requirements for the support account for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.

Annex I

List of current enterprise-critical systems and their resilience status

1. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of its report on information and communications technology, disaster recovery and business continuity for the United Nations (A/63/774), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions commented on the process for determining critical information technology systems.

2. In its resolution 63/262, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prioritize systems in order to minimize the cost of disaster recovery and business continuity. In this respect, the Advisory Committee urged the Secretariat to make every effort to conclude this process expeditiously and to provide the Assembly with an inventory of systems classified according to their degree of criticality at the time of its consideration of this question.

3. The prioritization exercise is being undertaken by the Business Continuity Management Unit of the Office of Central Support Services as part of the business continuity planning process, and the designation of critical systems is a key outcome of this process. The determination of critical systems for United Nations Headquarters has been completed and the list of designated critical systems was included in the Secretariat business continuity plan, which was endorsed by the senior emergency policy team on 29 June 2010. Additional systems will be evaluated as appropriate.

4. The Advisory Committee was also of the view that the terminology used to qualify systems, which are referred to as critical, major, important or non-critical, merited clarification.

5. In response to the above-mentioned request of the General Assembly and the Advisory Committee's request for further clarification, a list of the critical Headquarters applications and technology systems is provided in the table below, along with information on where and how the systems are hosted and backed up within the Secretariat.

6. The table contains a list of 76 applications, which have been identified as critical (see column 1). Of those, a total of 25 applications are designated as enterprise-critical.

Enterprise-critical applications and systems (currently resilient)

7. All the applications with this designation (column 4) can be run from backup servers in the secondary data centre. This means that if the primary data centre goes offline, those applications can still operate; they are fully resilient in the secondary data centre.

Data backed up in the secondary data centre

8. The table also identifies 51 local applications that are critical, 20 of which are also backed up by the secondary data centre in Piscataway (column 2). These applications cannot be run from backup servers in the secondary data centre, but the historical information contained in the systems is safeguarded. Hence, if the primary data centre has a partial or total outage, data for the applications is not lost (e.g.

Lotus Notes e-mail, iSeek web pages). Some of the data are replicated instantly, such as Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) data, e-mail and security videos, while other data are copied nightly.

Mobile Office

9. If the primary data centre remains online but staff are required to work from home, for example in the case of a pandemic, some operations can still be accessed remotely from home, provided the staff member has Mobile Office access on his or her computer. All 25 enterprise-critical applications and 20 critical local applications are accessible via Mobile Office (column 3).

Systems designated as critical at United Nations Headquarters

Application (1)	*Data backed up in secondary data centre (2)*	*Available in Mobile Office (remote access) (3)*	*Enterprise-critical applications/systems (currently resilient) (4)*	*Department (5)*
1. IMIS 2. Lotus Notes 3. iSeek 4. Shared drives 5. Galaxy/Inspira 6. un.org 7. CORLOG database 8. Mobile Office	Y	Y	Y	Multiple departments
9. Customer relationship management, Siebel	Y	Y	Y	EOSG
10. Nucleus 11. MARS 12. FPMS 13. Videoconferencing	Y	Y	N	DFS
14. Sun system 15. CDU case files 16. SLAS roster 17. Oxford Analytical 18. CMOS database 19. PMSTAR 20. Government claims 21. Management system 22. HP Open View	N	N	N	DFS
23. Swift 24. BIS 25. OPICS 26. IMIS DIAG (diagnostic) 27. OPICS Integrated Consolidated System	Y	Y	Y	OPPBA

Application (1)	*Data backed up in secondary data centre (2)*	*Available in Mobile Office (remote access) (3)*	*Enterprise-critical applications/systems (currently resilient) (4)*	*Department (5)*
28. Nova				
29. UNICEF SAP				
30. Insight				
31. FMT				
32. Paradox	N	N	N	OPPBA
33. Invoice tracker				
34. Bloomberg Anywhere				
35. ODS	Y	Y	Y	DGACM
36. ProcurePlus				
37. ProcurePlus bid processing				
38. ProcurePlus reporting system				
39. ProcurePlus scheduling system	Y	Y	Y	OCSS/PD
40. ProcurePlus contract tracking				
41. Requisition assignment system				
42. Requisition tracking system				
43. Nova (CMP tailored)	Y	Y	N	CMP
44. Microsoft Project				
45. AutoCad	N	N	N	CMP
46. Primavera				
47. e-Meets				
48. e-Doc				
49. DTSearch	Y	Y	N	DGACM
50. Photoshop				
51. InDesign				
52. APG				
53. NICE				
54. Avanti	N	N	N	DGACM
55. Adobe CS3				
56. Kodak Prinergy EVO				
57. sqlP				
58. Trim Context 6				
59. Sabre	Y	Y	N	OCSS/FCSD
60. Vendor registration system				
61. Laissez-passer issuance and administration system	N	N	N	OCSS/FCSD
62. Various Lotus Notes databases	Y	Y	N	DPA
63. UN file transfer protocol	N	N	N	DPI
64. ProGen payroll	Y	Y	N	DPKO
65. AllPerson				

Application *(1)*	*Data backed up in secondary data centre* *(2)*	*Available in Mobile Office (remote access)* *(3)*	*Enterprise-critical applications/systems (currently resilient)* *(4)*	*Department* *(5)*
66. Human resources data warehouse	N	N	N	OHRM
67. CRM (OHRM)				
68. CMS				
69. Ez-HR				
70. Earthmed (MSD)	Y	Y	N	OHRM/MSD
71. Auto audit				
72. Case management system OIOS	N	N	N	OIOS
73. DSS website control	Y	Y	N	DSS
74. TRIP				
75. United Nations Security Management Network				
76. Security management system database	N	N	N	DSS

Abbreviations: BIS, budget information system; CDU, Conduct and Discipline Unit; CMOS, Current Military Operations Service; CMP, capital master plan project; CMS, content management system; CRM, customer relationship management; DGACM, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management; PD, Procurement Division; DFS, Department of Field Support; DPKO, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DPA, Department of Political Affairs; DPI, Department of Public Information; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; EOSG, Executive Office of the Secretary-General; FCSD, Facilities and Commercial Services Division; FMT, funds monitoring tool; FPMS, Field Personnel Management System; MARS, Mail Action Records System; MSD, Medical Services Division; NICE, Neptune Intelligence Computer Engineering; ODS, Official Document System; OHRM, Office of Human Resources Management; OIOS, Office of Internal Oversight Services; OPICS, Operations Processing Integrated Control System; OPPBA, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts; PMSTAR, Police and Military Staff Travel and Rotation; SAP, Systems, Applications and Products in Data-Processing; SLAS, Senior Leadership Appointments Section; TRIP, travel request information processing; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund.

Annex II

Responses to matters raised by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. In its report on information and communications technology, disaster recovery and business continuity for the United Nations (A/63/774), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions raised a number of matters, specifically in paragraphs 7, 8, 14, 20 and 21, which are set out in the table below, together with the response of the Secretary-General.

2. The Committee also commented on the process for determining critical systems in paragraphs 13 and 14, which are addressed in annex I.

Recommendation	*Response*
The Committee recommends that a final decision on whether to lease or purchase be based on an analysis of which option would result in the least cost to the Organization, taking into account the expected lifespan of the relevant ICT equipment (A/63/774, para. 7).	In deciding the location of the secondary data centre, a thorough analysis was undertaken with respect to the costs associated with either renovating the existing facility in the DC2 Building or seeking an acceptable lease for a nearby "ready" facility. A secondary data centre in Piscataway represented the best alternative, due to significant difficulties with the DC2 facility related to deficient emergency power, poor air conditioning and other factors, which made it unlikely that a retrofit would be possible within the time frames required by the capital master plan. It was imperative to meet this time frame, since there were significant potential costs related to construction delays (approximately $14 million per month) if an operational backup facility could not be completed on time. The secondary data centre was completed on time and construction delays were avoided, which demonstrates that the best alternative for the Secretariat was selected.
The Committee was informed that, due to capacity limitations in the primary data centre in the Secretariat building, [certain] non-critical departmental applications are hosted in DC2 only (ibid., para. 14).	The migration of the primary data centre to the North Lawn Building was completed in 2010 and the new facility has greater capacity, which means that the non-critical systems previously hosted in the DC2 secondary data centre are now hosted in the primary data centre facility.
The Committee emphasizes the importance of the conduct of a full analysis of costs and the provision of complete costing information to facilitate its consideration of and decision-making on such proposals, particularly in the light of the potential for duplication and the resource implications (ibid., para. 8).	The proposed organizational resilience management system framework will provide a business-led coordinated strategy which will ensure that organizational resilience is realized at the most efficient cost.

Recommendation	*Response*
The Committee further recommends that the Secretary-General be requested to review the migration strategy with a view to seeking efficiencies, prioritizing among the critical and non-critical applications to be migrated and optimizing the utilization of existing facilities, and to ensure that the scope of the project is as lean as possible, consistent with the need to preserve the integrity of the Organization's data (ibid., para. 20).	The Secretary-General presented his proposal for streamlining data centres in his report on the status of implementation of the information and communications technology strategy for the United Nations Secretariat (A/65/491), which also described estimated savings associated with the establishment of an enterprise data centre. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to present new and/or revised proposals (resolution 65/259) and in response the Secretary-General has set out amended proposals in his report on enterprise information and communications technology initiatives for the United Nations Secretariat (A/66/94, sect. II.D). This proposal envisages that the local data centre configuration will require facilities such as the secondary data centre to be maintained, but with a much smaller footprint and at a lower cost. It should be noted that the Headquarters secondary data centre was designed with a small footprint, with a view to later migrating the enterprise-critical systems to an enterprise data centre when ready. As elaborated upon in the above-mentioned report, the Secretary-General has fully leveraged all existing facilities to lower costs and restated the benefits related to the enterprise data centre concept. After thorough analysis, it was determined that it was less expensive and more efficient to leverage existing facilities in the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, and the United Nations Support Base in Valencia. In addition, this will stem migration costs for enterprise systems, such as Umoja and others. Migration will be implemented with close consultation between departments, offices, the Business Continuity Management Unit and the Office of Information and Communications Technology. Enterprise-critical systems will be hosted in the enterprise data centre, while local unique systems will be hosted in local data centres and will be backed up in local secondary data centres. In this manner, only enterprise-critical applications will be backed up at the enterprise data centre, significantly reducing operating and disaster recovery costs to the Secretariat.

Recommendation	*Response*
The Committee recommends that the Secretary-General be requested to utilize the services of an independent expert possessing a high degree of technical experience in the field of migration and relocation of data centres to validate the project implementation plan and provide advice to the implementation team, as required, without disrupting the project schedule, to be funded from within existing resources (ibid., para. 21).	Since the report of the Committee was prepared, the Business Continuity Management Unit and the Office of Information and Communications Technology have identified the required methodologies and are currently implementing processes based on these best practice methodologies to effectively manage this ongoing need of classifying systems/applications. These methodologies and practices were used to determine the population of critical systems for Headquarters, which has now been completed. The resulting list comprises both enterprise-critical and other unique, critical local systems, and is set out in annex I to the present report.

United Nations A/66/517–S/2011/649

General Assembly
Security Council

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19 October 2011

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 109
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 12 October 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter, dated 12 October 2011, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its attachments* to the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

* The attached charging document is circulated in the language of submission only.

11-55638 (E) 201011

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Annex

Enclosed please find the letter that I wrote to you yesterday regarding the recently disrupted conspiracy to assassinate in Washington, D.C., the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States and to carry out additional follow-on attacks inside the United States and against other countries. As noted in the letter, we have confirmed information that this conspiracy was conceived, sponsored and directed by elements of the Government of Iran. Had this terrorist plot not been disrupted, it would likely have resulted in the injury or death of the Saudi Ambassador and others.

We request that you transmit the present letter, yesterday's enclosed letter, and the enclosed charging document to the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Susan E. **Rice**

Enclosure

11 October 2011

I would like to bring to your attention an attempted plot that constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. The United States has recently disrupted a conspiracy to assassinate in Washington, D.C., the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States and to carry out additional follow-on attacks inside the United States and against other countries. We have confirmed information that this conspiracy was conceived, sponsored and directed by elements of the Government of Iran. Had this terrorist plot not been disrupted, it would likely have resulted in the injury or death of the Saudi Ambassador and others.

According to our information, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and several of its high-ranking officers, including Hamed Abdollahi, Abdul Reza Shahlai and Ali Gholam Shakuri, directed and funded the conspiracy.

This plot constitutes a violation of Iran's commitments under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973). Consistent with this Convention and pursuant to United States law, on 11 October 2011, the United States brought charges in the United States Federal Court of the Southern District of New York against Manssor Arbabsiar, who is a citizen of Iran and a naturalized United States citizen, and Ali Gholam Shakuri, who is a national of Iran. Enclosed is the charging document containing the details of the conspiracy. The United States arrested Arbabsiar on 29 September 2011. He is currently in United States custody in New York City, and the United States plans to prosecute him to the full extent of United States law. Ali Gholam Shakuri remains at large.

In accordance with article 6 of the Convention, the United States requests that you notify Iran of the above measures. The United States expects Iran, in line with its obligations under this Convention, to undertake immediate, credible and verifiable action to hold accountable any other persons responsible for this conspiracy, including but not limited to Ali Gholam Shakuri. The United States has directly notified the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the State of which the internationally protected person concerned is a national, of the above measures.

The United States notes that this incident also constitutes a violation of other international legal obligations, including the requirement contained in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) that States "refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists". We intend to discuss this matter with other members of the Security Council.

We request that you transmit the present letter and the enclosed charging document to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Susan E. **Rice**

Attachment

Approved: 
GLEN A. KOPP/EDWARD Y. KIM
Assistant United States Attorneys

Before: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. DOLINGER
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	SEALED AMENDED COMPLAINT
	:	Violations of
- v. -	:	18 U.S.C. §§ 1117, 1958, 2, 2332a, 2332b
MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri,"	:	COUNTY OF OFFENSE: NEW YORK
Defendants.	:	

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

O. Robert Woloszyn, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and charges as follows:

COUNT ONE
Conspiracy to Murder A Foreign Official

1. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, knowingly and intentionally combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Section 1116 of Title 18, United States Code.

2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would and did agree to kill a foreign official, to wit, ARBABSIAR and SHAKURI agreed with each other and with others to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia, while the Ambassador was in the United States.

Overt Acts

3. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the

illegal object thereof, the following overt acts were committed, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:

a. On or about August 1, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, caused an overseas wire transfer of approximately $49,960 to be sent by a foreign entity from a bank located in a foreign country to an FBI undercover bank account (the "UC Bank Account"). Before reaching the UC Bank Account, the funds were transferred through a bank in Manhattan, New York.

b. On or about August 9, 2011, ARBABSIAR caused an overseas wire transfer of approximately $49,960 to be sent by a foreign entity from a bank located in a foreign country to the UC Bank Account. Before reaching the UC Bank Account, the funds were transferred through a bank in Manhattan, New York.

c. In or about the spring of 2011, GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, provided thousands of dollars to ARBABSIAR in Iran to pay for expenses related to furthering the plot to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1117.)

COUNT TWO
Foreign Travel and Use of Interstate and Foreign Commerce Facilities in the Commission of Murder-For-Hire

4. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, willfully and knowingly traveled in foreign commerce and used, and caused another to use, a facility of interstate and foreign commerce, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of the United States, to wit, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, as consideration for the receipt of, and as consideration for a promise and agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value, as those terms are defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958(b), to wit, ARBABSIAR caused to be wired approximately $100,000 into the United States, as partial consideration for the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1958 and 2.)

COUNT THREE
Conspiracy to Engage in Foreign Travel
and Use Interstate and Foreign Commerce Facilities
In the Commission of Murder-For-Hire

5. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.

6. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would and did agree together and with each other to use travel in foreign commerce and the facilities of interstate and foreign commerce, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of the United States, to wit, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, as consideration for the receipt of, and as consideration for a promise and agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value, to wit, ARBABSIAR, SHAKURI, and others known and unknown, caused to be wired approximately $100,000 into the United States as partial consideration for the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

Overt Acts

7. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.)

COUNT FOUR
Conspiracy To Use A Weapon of Mass Destruction

8. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a

"Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(A) and (C).

9. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would use a weapon of mass destruction, namely, a destructive device as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 921, against a person within the United States, where a facility of interstate and foreign commerce was used in furtherance of the offense, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, and where a perpetrator of the offense traveled in foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense, to wit, ARBABSIAR and SHAKURI agreed with each other and with others to use an explosive device against the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

Overt Acts

10. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(A) and (C).)

COUNT FIVE
Conspiracy to Commit An Act of Terrorism
Transcending National Boundaries

11. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2332b(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).

12. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and

unknown, would kill and maim persons within the United States and would create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to others by destroying and damaging structures, conveyances and other real and personal property within the United States, in violation of the laws of the United States, including Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, where interstate and foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, and where the offense would have obstructed, delayed and affected interstate commerce had it been consummated, to wit, ARBABSIAR and SHAKURI, during meetings outside the United States, agreed with each other and with others to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia, while the Ambassador was in the United States.

Overt Acts

13. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges are, in part, as follows:

14. I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since March of 1999. I have participated in the investigation of this matter, and have spoken with other individuals, including other law-enforcement officials, about this investigation. The facts and circumstances of this investigation have been summarized for the specific purposes of the instant affidavit. No attempt has been made to set forth the complete factual history of this investigation or all of its details.

15. I make this affidavit based on, among other things, my personal review of evidence obtained in the course of the investigation, as well as information and belief. The sources of my information and belief include, but are not limited to, conversations with other law-enforcement officers; reviews of reports and other documents prepared by law-enforcement personnel; reviews of business records; draft transcripts and translations of recordings, as well as the underlying recordings themselves; and the defendant's post-arrest statements. Where the actions, statements and conversations of others, or the

contents of documents, are recounted or described herein, they are related in substance and in part, unless otherwise indicated.

I. OVERVIEW

16. As set forth more fully below, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, is a naturalized citizen of the United States who holds both a United States and an Iranian passport. ARBABSIAR and his Iran-based co-conspirators, including GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, a member of the Qods Force, see infra ¶ 17, have been plotting the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia ("Ambassador"). In furtherance of this conspiracy, ARBABSIAR has met on a number of occasions in Mexico with a Drug Enforcement Administration confidential source ("CS-1"). In the course of these meetings, CS-1 has posed as an associate of a sophisticated and violent international drug-trafficking cartel. See infra n.2. ARBABSIAR arranged to hire CS-1 and his purported criminal associates to murder the Ambassador, and SHAKURI and other Iran-based co-conspirators were aware of and approved the plan. With SHAKURI's approval, ARBABSIAR caused approximately $100,000 to be wired into a bank account in the United States for CS-1 – as a down-payment to CS-1 for his anticipated killing of the Ambassador.

II. BACKGROUND: THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND THE QODS FORCE

17. During the course of my investigation, I have become familiar with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the "IRGC") and the Qods Force. Based in part on my review of publicly-available information, including findings and statements by the United States Department of State, the United States Department of Treasury, and other "open source" information, I have learned the following: the IRGC is an arm of the Iranian military; the IRGC is suspected of having been involved in a number of foreign operations; the IRGC is composed of a number of branches, one of which is the Qods Force. The Qods Force conducts sensitive covert operations abroad, including terrorist attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings, and provides weapons and training to Iran's terrorist and militant allies. Among many other things, the Qods Force is believed to sponsor attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq, and in October 2007, the United States Treasury Department designated the Qods Force, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.

III. THE INVESTIGATION

A. MAY 2011: ARBABSIAR MEETS CS-1 AND DISCUSSES WITH HIM THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK

18. On or about May 24, 2011, according to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled back and forth from Texas to Mexico. In Mexico, ARBABSIAR met with CS-1.[1] During this May 24 meeting, and all others with ARBABSIAR, CS-1 posed as an associate of a drug-trafficking cartel ("Drug Cartel #1").[2] After the May 24 meeting with ARBABSIAR, CS-1 described to law-enforcement agents what had transpired. CS-1 explained that, at the meeting, ARBABSIAR inquired as to CS-1's knowledge, if any, with respect to explosives. According to CS-1, ARBABSIAR explained to CS-1 that he was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia. In response, and to further the discussion, CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that he was knowledgeable with respect to C-4 explosives.[3]

19. On or about May 30, 2011, according to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled internationally, by plane from Houston, Texas.

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[1] CS-1 is a paid confidential source. Previously, CS-1 was charged in connection with a narcotics offense by authorities of a certain U.S. state ("State"). In exchange for CS-1's cooperation in various narcotics investigations, the State charges were dismissed. CS-1 has previously provided reliable and independently corroborated information to federal law-enforcement agents; this information has led to numerous seizures of narcotics. In addition, CS-1 has been paid by federal law-enforcement officials in connection with the work he has done.

[2] Drug Cartel #1 is a large, sophisticated, and violent drug-trafficking cartel. It is well-known throughout North America, and its principal places of operation are Mexico and the United States. According to published reports, Drug Cartel #1 has access to military-grade weaponry and explosives, and has engaged in numerous acts of violence, including assassinations and murders.

[3] "C-4" is a type of plastic explosive. Like other plastic explosives, C-4 can generally be molded, so that it can be shaped and formed with a certain degree of precision.

B. JUNE AND JULY 2011: ARBABSIAR RETURNS TO MEXICO AND HIRES CS-1 TO KILL THE UNITED STATES-BASED AMBASSADOR OF SAUDI ARABIA

20. On or about June 23, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, who had traveled internationally, see supra ¶ 19, returned by plane to Mexico.

21. According to CS-1, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, again met with CS-1 in Mexico in late June and July. Over the course of a series of meetings, ARBABSIAR explained to CS-1 that his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and CS-1's purported criminal associates to perform. These included, among others, the murder of the Ambassador.

22. On or about July 14, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with CS-1 in Mexico. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 made an audio recording of the meeting. CS-1 and ARBABSIAR spoke English during the meeting. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the July 14 recorded meeting, I learned that at this meeting the following occurred, among other things:[4]

a. CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that CS-1 would need to use "[a]t least four guys" and that CS-1 was "talking to one of the guys" and would "take the one point five for the Saudi Arabia." I understand this to mean that CS-1 would need to use four men to assassinate the Ambassador and that the cost to ARBABSIAR of conducting the assassination would be $1.5 million.[5] CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that he would "go ahead and work on Saudi Arabia, get all the information that we can"; ARBABSIAR agreed that the assassination of the Ambassador should be handled first.[6] After CS-1 stated, "you just want the, the main guy,"

[4] In his post-arrest statement, see infra Part IV, ARBABSIAR has admitted that he participated in each of the recorded meetings described in this Complaint, and he has confirmed that he agreed to pay CS-1 to kill the Ambassador.

[5] Both above, and throughout, the quoted language is taken from the draft transcripts. My understanding of the meaning of those quoted terms, where supplied, is based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation.

[6] Prior to the July 14, 2011 meeting, CS-1 had reported that he and ARBABSIAR had discussed the possibility of attacks on

ARBABSIAR confirmed that he just wanted the "[A]mbassador" -- which I understand to mean that ARBABSIAR wanted CS-1 to arrange for the assassination of the Ambassador before executing the other attacks they had discussed.

b. CS-1 and ARBABSIAR then discussed how ARBABSIAR would pay CS-1. ARBABSIAR asked CS-1 what bank he planned to use, and CS-1 stated that he would give ARBABSIAR "an account number." At a later time during the same conversation, ARBABSIAR stated that the "money is [in] Iran," and that he (ARBABSIAR) had received a call indicating that the money would be at the house of a certain individual ("Individual #1"). When ARBABSIAR called Individual #1, "he [Individual #1] said he had it there" and that he (Individual #1) had received "the money at nine in the morning." ARBABSIAR said the "money's a hundred thousand" but that he (ARBABSIAR) would have to "send a hundred . . . ten thousand, ten thousand, ten thousand. I don't wanna send it to one guy, one shot." I understand ARBABSIAR to mean that he had $100,000 in Iran to pay CS-1 as a first payment toward the assassination of the Ambassador, but that ARBABSIAR wanted to send the money to CS-1 in installments and not in a single transfer.

c. During their July 14 meeting, CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR about ARBABSIAR's cousin, who, according to ARBABSIAR, was located in Iran and had requested that ARBABSIAR find someone (ultimately, CS-1) who could carry out the attack on the Ambassador described above. ARBABSIAR explained that his cousin was "wanted in America," had been "on the CNN," and was a "big general in [the] army." ARBABSIAR further explained that there were a number of parts to the army of Iran and that his cousin "work[s] in outside, in other countries for the Iranian government[.]" ARBABSIAR further explained that his cousin did not wear a uniform or carry a gun, and had taken certain unspecified actions related to a bombing in Iraq. Compare supra ¶ 17. In the portions of the July 14 meeting referenced in this sub-paragraph, I understand ARBABSIAR to be saying that his cousin works for the military of Iran, in particular, for the Qods Force, and that his cousin focuses on matters outside of Iran.

d. At the end of the July 14 meeting, CS-1 told ARBABSIAR, "[w]e're gonna start doing the guy," which I

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a number of other targets. These targets included foreign government facilities associated with Saudi Arabia and with another country, and these targets were located within and outside of the United States.

understand to mean that CS-1 and ARBABSIAR confirmed that CS-1 would proceed to plan the assassination of the Ambassador.

23. On or about July 17, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with CS-1 – again, see supra ¶ 22, in Mexico. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 recorded the meeting. CS-1 and ARBABSIAR spoke English during the meeting. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the July 17 meeting, I learned that at this meeting the following occurred, among other things:

a. CS-1 made reference to "my guy over there . . . he's already in Washington," which I understand to be a reference to the fact that one of CS-1's workers had purportedly already traveled to Washington, D.C. to surveil the Ambassador. CS-1 then asked, "I got this on the computer . . . is this the guy right here?" – to which ARBABSIAR replied, "Yeah, that's him." Based, among other things, on my discussions with other agents, I understand that during this portion of the conversation, CS-1 showed ARBABSIAR a photograph of the Ambassador.

b. CS-1 described what he had purportedly begun to learn about the Ambassador, stating that the Ambassador has "eight to seven security people around him . . . [h]e goes out and eat like two times a week in a restaurant . . . [m]y guy is already over there . . . doing surveillance." CS-1 then reflected, "I don't know what exactly your cousin [see supra ¶ 22(c)'] wants me to do. . . ." After some further conversation, ARBABSIAR replied: "[h]e wants you to kill this guy." CS-1 then explained, "there's gonna be like American people there . . . in the restaurant. You want me to do it outside or in the restaurant?" ARBABSIAR answered: "[d]oesn't matter how you do it. I mean, if you do it by himself, kill is better, but . . . sometime, you know, you have no choice, is that right?" I understand ARBABSIAR and CS-1 to have been discussing how the Ambassador should be killed, and ARBABSIAR to be saying that his cousin wanted the Ambassador killed; without bystander casualties if possible ("by himself, kill is better") but not if operational necessities dictated otherwise ("sometime, you know, you have no

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[7] During the course of the July 17 conversation, ARBABSIAR further described his cousin. ARBABSIAR said that his cousin was "working for [the] government [of Iran] but he's working outside. . . . He's working like . . .[l]ike [a named, non-Iranian intelligence agency]."

choice").[8]

c. On a number of occasions, ARBABSIAR reassured CS-1 that CS-1 and his (CS-1's) men would indeed be paid for killing the Ambassador. ARBABSIAR told CS-1 to tell the people working for him (CS-1) that he (ARBABSIAR) could "guarantee the money. . . I [ARBABSIAR] got the money coming." ARBABSIAR emphasized that "this is politics, ok . . . it's not like, eh, personal . . . This is politics, so these people [ARBABSIAR's co-conspirators in Iran] they pay this government . . . he's got [ARBABSIAR's cousin has got] the, got the government behind him . . . . . he's not paying from his pocket." To facilitate payment, at one point during the July 17 meeting, CS-1 gave ARBABSIAR "the account number . . . in [a U.S. bank] . . . and the U.S. routing number" – the unique number associated with the United States bank account into which ARBABSIAR could arrange for payment to be made to CS-1 for the assassination of the Ambassador.

d. ARBABSIAR explained that his cousin and an individual who worked for his cousin had paid his (ARBABSIAR's) expenses related to the assassination plot. ARBABSIAR stated, "I tell him [ARBABSIAR's cousin], give me just another fifteen. Just . . . next morning they send one guy, you know, that work for him [ARBABSIAR's cousin]. He's like a colonel, the guy." CS-1 asked, "Did the colonel take the money, the money to you?" ARBABSIAR responded, "Yes, man. He opened the door for me, the colonel, he bring the envelope. He put the envelope there for me." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, including my participation in the post-arrest interview of ARBABSIAR, I understand that the "colonel" that ARBABSIAR referred to is GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and that ARBABSIAR was stating that after he received expense money from his cousin, he received an additional expense payment from SHAKURI, see infra n.13.

e. At the end of the July 17 meeting, ARBABSIAR

[8] On numerous occasions during the July 17 meeting, ARBABSIAR made it clear that the assassination needed to go forward, even if doing so would cause mass casualties. For example, ARBABSIAR said: "They want that guy [the Ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him, fuck 'em." In a similar vein, ARBABSIAR and CS-1 also discussed the means by which the Ambassador would be killed. CS-1 said: "I'm gonna blow him [the Ambassador] up or shoot him, whatever you want." ARBABSIAR responded: "Yeah, it doesn't matter . . . [w]hatever is easy for . . . how is possible for you."

declared "[l]et it hit the restaurant. If, if you can do it outside, do it. If not, restaurant, hit it, it's ok," by which I understand ARBABSIAR to mean that if CS-1 could not assassinate the Ambassador outside the restaurant, he should "hit" or bomb the restaurant. In response, CS-1 then noted that there were "from a hundred, a hundred and fifty [people in the restaurant]" and "buildings on the sides," and "senators [U.S. Senators who dine there]," all of which ARBABSIAR dismissed as "no problem" or "no big deal," meaning that the potential for such casualties should not dissuade CS-1 from killing the Ambassador.

C. JULY AND AUGUST 2011: PAYMENTS ARE MADE TO CS-1

24. According to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled from Mexico, departing for a foreign country, on or about July 20, 2011.[9]

25. As noted above, see supra ¶ 23, at the July 17 meeting, CS-1 provided MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, with a bank account and routing number, so that payment could be made for the assassination of the Ambassador. The account information CS-1 provided was in fact associated with the UC Bank Account.

26. On or about August 1, 2011, an overseas wire transfer of approximately $49,960 was sent by a foreign entity ("Foreign Entity-1") from a bank located in a foreign country (the "Foreign Bank") through a bank in Manhattan to the UC Bank Account.

27. On or about August 6, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR whether he (ARBABSIAR) had "already finished the other half of . . . the money." ARBABSIAR replied, "I sent it yesterday." I understand that ARBABSIAR was acknowledging that the previous day he sent to CS-1 the second half of the approximately $100,000 down-payment, see supra ¶ 22(b), for the murder of the Ambassador. I understand that "the other half" of the $100,000 was received on or about August 9,

[9] Three days prior to ARBABSIAR's July 20 flight, during the July 17 meeting with CS-1, see supra, ARBABSIAR indicated to CS-1 that ARBABSIAR would be traveling to Iran on July 20 to see his cousin.

2011, see infra ¶ 28, and that the first "half" was received on or about August 1, 2011, see supra ¶ 26.

28. On or about August 9, 2011, an overseas wire transfer of approximately $49,960 was sent by another foreign entity ("Foreign Entity-2") from the Foreign Bank through a bank in Manhattan to the UC Bank Account.

29. On or about August 11, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, ARBABSIAR asked CS-1, "Did you check the bank?" CS-1 responded in the affirmative, "I check in the bank, everything is there." I understand that ARBABSIAR was confirming that CS-1 received the $49,960 that arrived in the UC Bank Account on or about August 9, 2011, see supra ¶ 28.

D. SEPTEMBER 2011: ARBABSIAR RETURNS TO MEXICO

30. On or about September 2, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, ARBABSIAR asked CS-1 if the "building is getting painted" and CS-1 responded "we're still doing that." I understand that by asking that question, ARBABSIAR was asking CS-1 whether the arrangements to kill the Ambassador were still underway.[10] ARBABSIAR then stated, "once we do this one, you gonna open a [U/I] like, uh . . . you got the number for the safe" and "[o]nce you open the door, that's it. You know what I mean? . . . [y]ou don't have to worry about anything." I understand that ARBABSIAR was explaining to CS-1 that after CS-1 and his team assassinated the Ambassador, CS-1 would make money from that and other projects with ARBABSIAR and his associates, see supra n.6.

31. On or about September 12, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the

[10] Based on my training and in my experience, individuals who speak explicitly about criminal activity during in-person meetings, see, e.g., supra ¶¶ 22, 23, often speak in coded language during telephone conversations, in an effort to conceal the subject matter of their discussions in the event that they are overheard or intercepted.

telephone. CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation. Based on my review of a draft transcript of the recording, I learned that ARBABSIAR told CS-1 that "the number is gonna stay the same thing . . . [o]ne and a half . . ." I understand ARBABSIAR was stating that CS-1 would receive the same amount of money ("[o]ne and a half": $1.5 million) for the assassination that ARBABSIAR and CS-1 had previously discussed. See supra ¶ 22(a). ARBABSIAR also referred to "the number we did" and told CS-1 that he could "prepare for those too . . . but we need to at least one of them." I understand ARBABSIAR to have been informing CS-1 that in the future CS-1 could prepare for the additional attacks previously mentioned, see supra n.6, but that CS-1 first needed to assassinate the Ambassador. ARBABSIAR promised CS-1 that if he does "at least one . . . I'll send the balance for you," which I understand to mean that CS-1 would receive the remainder of his $1.5 million payment after the Ambassador has been assassinated. ARBABSIAR also stated, "[t]he first one they just want it . . . for test," which I understand to mean that CS-1's first task was designed as a test run, with future assignments to follow if the assassination was successful.

32. On or about September 20, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation. Based on my review of a draft transcript of the recording, I learned that CS-1 told ARBABSIAR, "I'm ready for the . . . for the thing, for the house, man, to be painted but . . . I need to, I need, either I need you or I need half of the . . . of the check that we're gonna receive to . . . so I can go ahead and . . . be finished with the job." I understand CS-1 to have been requesting that ARBABSIAR either pay one-half of the agreed upon price ($1.5 million, see supra ¶ 22(a)) for the murder of the Ambassador or go personally to Mexico to serve himself as collateral for the final payment of the fee for the assassination.[11] Based on my training and experience, I know that this form of personal guarantee is common for large scale illicit transactions. Ultimately, based on my review of the transcript of the September 20, 2011 call, I believe that ARBABSIAR agreed to travel to Mexico per CS-1's request to guarantee payment for the murder of the Ambassador ("I'm gonna go over there [in] two [or] three days, I'll go over there. . . . Don't wait for me. Get ready, but I'll be over there."). Later during the night of September 20, CS-1 returned a call from ARBABSIAR. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation.

[11] CS-1 initially requested that ARBABSIAR send someone to Mexico as collateral in a recorded call between CS-1 and ARBABSIAR on or about August 28, 2011.

During the call, ARBABSIAR inquired as to "how long [he] need[s] to stay in Mexico." I understand ARBABSIAR to have been asking how long he would have to stay in Mexico to supply a sufficient guarantee for payment to CS-1 and CS-1's associates following completion of the plot to murder the Ambassador.

E. THE ARREST AND SEARCH

33. On or about September 28, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, flew to Mexico. ARBABSIAR was denied entry into Mexico, and then flew on to John F. Kennedy International Airport ("JFK"), in New York City. During the flight, law-enforcement officials aboard conducted surveillance of the defendant without alerting him to their presence. After ARBABSIAR exited the plane at JFK, law-enforcement agents arrested ARBABSIAR.

34. After he was placed under arrest, law-enforcement agents recovered numerous items from MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, and from his luggage. (The luggage was searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a United States Magistrate Judge.) These items included, among other things: approximately $3,900 in United States currency, composed of one-hundred dollar bills; a sum of Iranian currency; an Iranian passport; a United States passport; and a travel itinerary reflecting a flight departing Mexico during October of 2011, with an ultimate destination of Tehran, Iran.

IV. ARBABSIAR'S CONFESSION

35. Several hours after his arrest, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, was advised of his Miranda rights and his right to a speedy presentment. ARBABSIAR agreed to waive those rights and to speak with law-enforcement agents. As set forth more fully below in the paragraphs that follow, during a series of Mirandized interviews, ARBABSIAR confessed to his participation in the plot described above.[12] In particular, and as described more fully below, ARBABSIAR admitted that he had arranged for CS-1 to murder the Ambassador; that he

[12] The interviews were conducted principally in English. Occasionally, ARBABSIAR spoke in Farsi. One of the law-enforcement agents who conducted the interviews is fluent in Farsi. A small portion of the substance of ARBABSIAR's oral statement is described in the instant Complaint. In addition to providing an oral statement, the defendant signed a typewritten statement admitting to the conduct that forms the basis for the charges herein.

(ARBABSIAR) had discussed with CS-1 the means by which CS-1 and his criminal associates would commit the murder; and that he (ARBABSIAR) made a down-payment to CS-1 for the murder by causing a total of $100,000 to be deposited in the UC Bank Account. Furthermore, ARBABSIAR admitted that in connection with this plot, he (ARBABSIAR) was recruited, funded, and directed by men he understood to be senior officials in the Qods Force, see supra ¶ 17. ARBABSIAR further explained that men he understood to be senior Qods Force officials were aware of and approved, among other things, the use of CS-1 in connection with the plot; payments to CS-1; and the means by which the Ambassador would be killed in the United States and the casualties that would likely result.

36. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, explained that his cousin, see supra, approached ARBABSIAR in the early spring of 2011, while ARBABSIAR was in Iran, and asked ARBABSIAR to work with him (ARBABSIAR's cousin). ARBABSIAR had long understood that his cousin (hereinafter "Iranian Official #1"), was a high-ranking member of the Qods Force. ARBABSIAR told Iranian Official #1 that as a result of his business in both Mexico and the United States, he (ARBABSIAR) knew a number of people who traveled between the two countries, and some of those people, he (ARBABSIAR) believed, were narcotics traffickers. Iranian Official #1 told ARBABSIAR that he wanted ARBABSIAR to hire someone who could kidnap the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States and that ARBABSIAR should find someone in the narcotics business, because people in that business are willing to undertake criminal activity in exchange for money.

37. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, further acknowledged that Iranian Official #1 subsequently provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses.[13] ARBABSIAR thereafter traveled to Mexico, where he met CS-1.[14]

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[13] In the course of his discussions with Iranian Official #1, Iranian Official #1 indicated that another individual, GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, worked for him (that is, for Iranian Official #1) as his (Iranian Official #1's) deputy. After Iranian Official #1 provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses, SHAKURI separately provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses.

[14] During the course of his interviews, ARBABSIAR explained how he came to meet CS-1.

38. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, admitted that, while he was in Mexico, he (ARBABSIAR) and CS-1 discussed, among other things, a plan to kill the Ambassador by bombing a restaurant the Ambassador frequented, for which CS-1 said he would charge $1.5 million. ARBABSIAR then returned to Iran from Mexico.

39. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, stated that upon his return to Iran, he (ARBABSIAR) met together on a number of occasions in Tehran with GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and a third individual, who ARBABSIAR understood was a high-ranking member of the Qods Force (hereinafter "Iranian Official #2").[15] ARRABSIAR stated he also met routinely on a one-on-one basis with SHAKURI. During these meetings, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR indicated that he (ARBABSIAR) had located a drug dealer in Mexico (referring to CS-1). ARBABSIAR was asked to have CS-1 kidnap or kill the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States, and told that it would need to be done fast. ARBABSIAR was also asked whether CS-1 would travel internationally, so that CS-1 could speak face-to-face with other operatives. ARBABSIAR indicated that CS-1 would not do so.

b. ARBABSIAR stated that the plan was to blow up a restaurant in the United States frequented by the Ambassador and that in light of that plan numerous people, in addition to the Ambassador, could be killed. This plan was approved.

c. ARBABSIAR was instructed to use code words when communicating with SHAKURI. For example, ARBABSIAR was instructed to use the code word "Chevrolet" for the Ambassador plot.

d. A down-payment of $100,000 to CS-1 for the

[15] ARBABSIAR has been shown an array of seven photographs. Amongst these seven photographs were one photograph of each of two men known to the United States to be senior members of the Qods Force. It is believed that these two photographs are not publicly available. ARBABSIAR identified one of these photographs as depicting Iranian Official #2. The person depicted in the photograph that ARBABSIAR identified is known to the United States to have used the alias by which ARBABSIAR knew Iranian Official #2.

murder of the Ambassador was approved.[16]

e. SHAKURI advised ARBABSIAR that an individual whom ARBABSIAR understood to be the leader of the Qods Force (hereinafter "Iranian Official #3"), was aware of what ARBABSIAR was doing and that he (ARBABSIAR) could meet with Iranian Official #3 in the future.

40. In or about late September 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, in Tehran. ARBABSIAR explained that CS-1 wanted either to receive half of the money previously promised for the completion of the murder, or to have ARBABSIAR travel back to Mexico as a guarantee of payment, see supra ¶ 32. SHAKURI stated that no more money would be given to CS-1, and advised ARBABSIAR against traveling back to Mexico. SHAKURI said that ARBABSIAR was responsible for himself if he did travel. SHAKURI then told ARBABSIAR to get in contact with him (SHAKURI) via telephone after ARBABSIAR'S arrival in Mexico so that he (SHAKURI) could be sure ARBABSIAR was well.

V. OCTOBER 2011: RECORDED TELEPHONE CALLS BETWEEN SHAKURI AND ARBABSIAR

41. Following the arrest of MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, ARBABSIAR agreed to place a recorded call to GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. On October 4, 2011, at the direction of federal law enforcement agents, ARBABSIAR placed a call to an Iranian telephone number ("Iranian Phone Number"). Agents monitored and recorded the call.[17] Following the call, ARBABSIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was SHAKURI. Based on my review of the draft translation of that recording I know that SHAKURI asked, "[a]re you ok, . . . are you well?" to which ARBABSIAR responded, "Yes, I wanted to see how you're doing and to tell you I am well." SHAKURI responded, "Okay, thank God, stay well." SHAKURI then added, "I was waiting," and asked,

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[16] Subsequently, Individual #1 told ARBABSIAR that he (Individual #1) had received a delivery of money from SHAKURI. ARBABSIAR then arranged for this money to be sent from Tehran to the United States.

[17] On this call and the calls referenced in paragraphs 42 and 43, ARBABSIAR and SHAKURI spoke in Farsi. I have reviewed draft translations of these three calls.

"what news . . . what did you do about the building?" Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand the question about "the building" to be a reference to the plot to murder the Ambassador and a question about its status. Cf. supra ¶ 30.

42. On October 5, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, placed another monitored and recorded call to the Iranian Phone Number. Following the call, ARBABSIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. Based on my review of a draft translation of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR stated, "I wanted to tell you, the Chevrolet is ready, it's ready, uh, to be done. I should continue, right?" See supra ¶ 39(c) (noting that "Chevrolet" was the agreed-upon code for the plot to murder the Ambassador). SHAKURI responded, "Yes. Yes, yes." SHAKURI later asked, "You mean you are buying all of it?" ARBABSIAR responded, "I don't know for now, it's ready, okay?" SHAKURI replied, "So buy it, buy it." ARBABSIAR confirmed, "Buy it? Okay." SHAKURI then stated, "Buy it, yes, buy all of it." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI confirmed by these statements that ARBABSIAR should move forward with the plot to murder the Ambassador.

b. ARBABSIAR then stated that "this boy wants, uh, some money, he wants some expenditure. What do you say, should we give him some more? He wants another 50," and SHAKURI responded, "With you, no, you . . . that amount is fine, [UI] brought me another car. Tell him to finish his work, then we'll give him the rest. He should buy the car for us first." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that on this call, SHAKURI was insisting that CS-1 should not receive any additional money until he had killed the Ambassador.

c. Thereafter, SHAKURI urged ARBABSIAR "[j]ust do it quickly, it's late, just buy it for me and bring it already." I understand that SHAKURI is urging ARBABSIAR to accomplish the agreed upon task - the murder of the Ambassador - as quickly as possible.

43. On October 7, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, placed another monitored and recorded call to the Iranian Phone Number. Following the call, ARBABSIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was

GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. Based on my review of a draft translation of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR stated, ". . . this Mexican, . . . keeps on insisting on the thing. He says, 'If - I need money, 50. I won't do the job if you don't pay.' And everything's ready." SHAKURI responded, "Okay." ARBABSIAR asked, "What do you say now?" SHAKURI replied, "I don't know. You guaranteed this yourself . . . of course, if we give it, we'll give it to you. Okay? If he gives it, fine; if not we must provide the 100 [or] 50. Tell him, [U/I]." ARBABSIAR then stated, "Well, yeah. Now, I - what do you say? What should I do? [U/I]" SHAKURI responded, "How much is he talking about?" ARBABSIAR said, "I don't know. He's saying, for instance, well now - he says well - so, I thought, so that the 100 we gave won't go to waste; that's why. On the other hand, we gave a 100 and that would go to waste as well." See supra ¶¶ 26-28 (noting that CS-1 was paid $100,000 as a down-payment for killing the Ambassador). SHAKURI replied, "Well, yeah, but what if you give this one it goes to waste as well?" Based on my participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was questioning whether additional payments should be made to CS-1 ("this Mexican"), in light of the fact that CS-1 had not yet killed the Ambassador, and had already been paid $100,000 ("100").

b. Shortly thereafter ARBABSIAR stated, referring to CS-1, "That's what the Mexican . . . wants . . . What can I do?" and SHAKURI responded, "Okay, today I'll discuss it to see what they say." Based on my experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI is explaining that he would consult with his superiors regarding whether they would be willing to pay CS-1 additional money.

c. Thereafter, SHAKURI stated, "You said that for sure they're saying that much. We didn't discuss it though, we - in any case, he needs to deliver it to us, okay?" to which ARBABSIAR responded, "Completely. Yeah, yeah, I know what you're saying." SHAKURI then said: "You guaranteed it" and ARBABSIAR responded, "Well, I guaranteed it, but they . . . they're not ordinary people . . . they're not law abiding . . . people." See supra ¶¶ 32, 33 (CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR to travel personally to Mexico as a guarantee that CS-1 would be paid in full upon the killing of the Ambassador; ARBABSIAR thereafter traveled to Mexico). Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was reminding ARBABSIAR that he (ARBABSIAR) traveled to Mexico to serve as a personal guarantee of full payment to CS-1 upon the killing of

the Ambassador.

d. SHAKURI then stated: "You said it yourself, they - from our point of view of - when we get our merchandise, we get our merchandise." SHAKURI added, "We have guaranteed the rest. You were our guarantee." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was stating that "we", meaning himself and others involved in the plot, had "guaranteed" full payment to CS-1 for the killing of the Ambassador by ARBABSIAR's presence in Mexico ("You were our guarantee"). See supra ¶¶ 32, 33.

WHEREFORE, deponent respectfully requests that MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, be imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, and that a warrant issue for the arrest of GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and that he be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.

O. Robert Wolszyn

(*Signed*) O. Robert Wolszyn
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this
11th day of October, 2011

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. DOLINGER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

United Nations

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Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the international independent commission of inquiry on the situation of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire

Note by the Secretary-General

The reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire (A/HRC/16/79 and A/HRC/17/49) and the report of the independent international commission of inquiry established to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of serious abuses and violations of human rights committed in Côte d'Ivoire following the presidential election of 28 November 2010, in order to identify those responsible for such acts and bring them to justice (A/HRC/17/48), circulated pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 16/25 and 17/21, are available on the Official Documents System.

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